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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
is not a party to the action to produce books and documents, must state facts
enabling the Court to determine that such books and documents are material
and relevant." See also State v. Continental Tobacco Co. (1903), 177 Mo. 1,
1. c. 43, 75 S. W. 737 and Ex parte Brown (1880), 72 Mo. 83, 37 Am. Rep.
426. State v. Davis (1893), 117 Mo. 614, 23 S. W. 759, held that a subpoena
which requires a druggist to produce all prescriptions filed in his store for
about a year was too indefinite. A similar case was State v. Bragg, 51 Mo.
App. 334, where a subpoena required the production before a grand jury of
all prescriptions compounded for a period of more than a month. Cases of
this sort are likely to be of growing frequency due to the increasing num-
ber of anti-trust proceedings. The case of Federal Trade Commission v.
American Tobacco Co. (1924), 264 U. S. 298, 68 L. Ed. 696, 44 S. Ct. 336,
upholds the right of a private corporation to be immune from governmental
fishing expeditions into its books and papers, and maintains that their dis-
closure cannot be compelled without some evidence of their relevancy and
upon a reasonable demand. This case was decided on a sound basis and
on just principles. J. J. C., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-TAPPING TELEPHONE
Wms.-Federal revenue officers tapped a telephone wire-an act forbid-
den by state statute. The incriminating conversation which they over-
heard was made the basis of a conviction for violating the prohibition law.
Hed, not unreasonable search and seizure such as is forbidden by the
fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Olmstead v. United States
(1928), 72 L. Ed. (adv.) 212, 48 S. Ct. 564.
The doctrine of making illegal all unreasonable searches and seizures has
its foundation in the common law of England. Entick v. Carrington and
Three Other King's Messengers (1762), 19 Howells State Trials 1029.
This principle is fully recognized in modern law. Today it is no longer a
question that the seizure of papers by Federal officers without a Federal
warrant is within the prohibition imposed by the fourth amendment. Boyd
v. United States (1885), 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 S. Ct. 524; United
States v. Hounday (1913), 208 F. 186. Also, it has been held that the ac-
quisition of papers by anyone connected with the Federal Government by
stealth, or through false pretention to friendship is an unreasonable seizure.
Gotded v. United States (1920), 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 697, 71 S. Ct. 261.
Sealed packages in the mails and letters are entitled to the protection given
by the fourth amendment. In re Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877. The
fourth amendment, however, has no application except to government of-
ficers.
The issue in the instant case is concerned with telephone messages. So
far as has been found no similar case has been decided. However, there
have been some holdings which might indicate the trend of the courts be-
fore this decision and possibly account for it in the light of precedent. In
the case of telegraph messages it has been held uniformly that they are not
privileged and that the telegraph operator may be compelled to disclose
their contents. State v. Litchfield (1870), 58 Me. 267; ex parte Brown
(1882), 72 Mo. 83, 37 Am. Rep. 426; U. S. v. Hunter (1883), 15 F. 712.
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But in such cases the question of the invasion of private premises is not in-
volved. In the principal case the Court was forced to declare expressly
that telephone wires, which the dissenting justices insisted were an ex-
tension of private premises which called for a similar extension of the pro-
tection afforded by the fourth amendment, could be interfered with at the
will of Federal officers.
Wire tapping is a crime in over thirty states, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
emphasizes in his dissent. It is a crime in the State of Washington, in
which the principal case arose. The majority of the Court holds in the in-
stant case that the commission of a crime against state law by Federal of-
ficials is not ground for holding a search and seizure to be in violation of
the fourth amendment. But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, 1. c. 573. Also, the brief for the Government desclaimed and
frowned upon the illegal act of wire tapping. See marginal note, 48 S. Ct.,
1. c. 575. It is hoped that the decision of the majority is not the final word
upon this subject. M. E. C., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-STATE TAx or FEDERAL INSTRUMEN-
TALITY.-A Mississippi statute provided for a tax of three cents on each
gallon of gasoline sold in the state. The state sued to recover taxes on
sales made by an oil company to the Federal Government for use of its
Coast Guard Fleet and Veterans' Hospital. The oil company did not in-
clude the tax in its price to the Government, and contended on writ of error
to the Supreme Court that if this statute wer construed to impose taxes
on such sales, it would be repugnant to the Federal Constitution. Held
(the court being divided five to four), that the necessary operation of the
statute when so construed would be directly to retard, impede, and burden
the exertion by the United States of its constitutional powers to operate
the fleet and hospital. Panhandle Oil Company v. State of Mississippi ex
rel. Knox, (1928), 72 L. Ed. 517; 48 S. Ct. 451.
Beginning with MeCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed.
579, a long line of cases has upheld the principle that the state governments
cannot lay a tax upon the constitutional means employed by the Govern-
ment of the Union to execute its constitutional powers--although McCul-
loch v. Maryland itself did not go as far as since has been believed. Dab-
bins v. Commissioners of Erie County (1842), 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022;
The Banks v. The Mayor (1868), 7 Wall. 16, 19 L. Ed. 57; Weston v. City
of Charleston (1829), 2 Pet. 448, 467, 7 L. Ed. 481; Van Brocklin 'v. Ander-
son (1886), 117 U. S. 151, 29 L. Ed. 845, 6 S. Ct. 670; Choctaw 0. & G. R.
Co. v. Harrison (1914), 235 U. S. 292, 59 L. Ed. 234, P5 S. Ct. 27; Indian
Terr. Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma (1915), 240 U. S. 522, 60 L. Ed.
779, 36 S. Ct. 453; Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1921), 257 U. S. 501, 66 L. Ed.
338, 42 S. Ct. 171. The opinion in the last-named case was written by Mr.
Justice Holmes, Justices Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke dissenting. Mr.
Justice Holmes voiced the chief dissent in the instant case, and it is singu-
lar to note that Justice Butler, in writing the opinion of the Court, says,
"The strictness of that rule (that the States may not burden or interfere
with execution of governmental powers) was emphasized in Gillespie v.
Oklahoma."
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